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I. INTRODUCTION
The aftermath of the financial crisis yielded much soul searching
on how regulatory structures should evolve to prevent future crises and
how to protect investors and consumers.' Useful discussion of changes
to the regulatory system must include acknowledgment of that
system's current organizational state of affairs and its propriety.
* © 2016 Kenneth M. Rosen. Associate Professor, The University of Alabama
School of Law. I would like to thank Dean Mark Brandon, my colleagues on the faculty, and
the Alabama Law School Foundation for their generous support of my research. I thank
Aaron Smith and Brian Church for excellent research assistance. I also thank the editors of
the Tulane LawReviewand participants in its Symposium.
1. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Naming Culprits in the Financial
Crisis, N.Y TIMEs, Apr. 14, 2011, at B 1. One particularly interesting aspect of the crisis
aftermath is the focus on larger-player issues, such as firms that may have become too-big-to-
fail. See, e.g., Tarullo Discusses Systemic Risk, [2009] 202 Bank Dig. Online (CCH) 5065
(Oct. 22, 2009) (noting the Federal Reserve Governor's emphasis on the too-big-to-fail
problem in regulatory reform). Certainly, collapses of large institutions can affect smaller,
retail purchasers of financial products. However, this Symposium should be praised for
emphasizing regulatory schemes that may seek to protect more directly the smaller players.
This recognizes a deep tradition of agencies protecting retail investors. Moreover, when retail
investors are protected and feel confident in product markets, they seem more likely to
continue to participate in those markets, adding to the strength of the economy. Capital
markets, for example, utilize investors in stocks to help fund the operation and expansion of
businesses through payment for those ownership interests represented by stocks. If
confidence dries up, economic participation may fail, causing future volatility and economic
crises.
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Students of regulation related to the protection of investors and
consumers of financial products will be well aware that in the United
States, a variety of administrative agencies and government actors are
involved in the regulatory process meant to provide such protection.
For instance, at the federal level, the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) is tasked with protecting investors in
financial products defined as securities through a variety of
mechanisms, including oversight of markets and the intermediaries
offering these products.' Traditionally, the United States Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) took the lead on issues related to
products falling within the realm of a futures contract.! The United
States Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Board of Governors
2. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, "unless the
context otherwise requires" a "security" is defined as
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond,
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or
in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange
relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a
"security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding
nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of
which is likewise limited.
Id. § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012); accord THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF
SECURTms REGULATION § 1.6 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing tests that determine whether an
interest is a "security" and identifying classes of exempted securities).
3. See HAZEN, supra note 2, § 1.4 (discussing the role of self-regulatory organiza-
tions, including exchanges).
4. In regulating contracts for the future delivery of commodities, the CFTC deals
with a broad array of derivatives because the definition of "commodity" is so broad. Under
the Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936), a "commodity"
means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill
feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and
oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil, and all other fats
and oils), cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock,
livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and all other goods and
articles, except onions ... and motion picture box office receipts (or any index,
measure, value, or data related to such receipts), and all services, rights, and
interests (except motion picture box office receipts, or any index, measure, value or
data related to such receipts) in which contracts for future delivery are presently or
in the future dealt in.
Id § la(9), 7 U.S.C. § la(9).
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of the Federal Reserve System (Fed), and associated entities have
focused on banking products Of course, state-level regulators, such
as state securities commissions' or providers of state banking charters,'
can be involved in such processes as well. Indeed, for some products,
state regulators may be characterized as the leaders on regulatory
schemes, such as those for insurance products
This U.S. organizational approach certainly is not the only one
available. Other nations have sought to unify regulatory authority over
a wider array of financial products and services in more centralized
bodies, such as fimancial services authorities Moreover, the
increasingly globalized nature of financial products and services, with
even retail consumers sometimes participating in foreign markets,
raises the question of whether such unified regulators should perhaps
be extended to the vesting of regulatory authority in a global, unified
regulatory body with control of purchaser-related issues for a wide
array of products.'"
This Symposium creatively and usefully brings together scholars
from the capital markets and consumer financial products regulatory
worlds to contemplate such possible convergence and consolidation.
This is both innovative and necessary because scholars in those worlds
face their own unique product end-user issues with approaches that
might vary from one world to another. More provocatively, the
Symposium organizers suggest that convergence of regulators and
approaches from those different worlds may have perils in addition to
benefits. Accordingly, as tasked by the Symposium's structure, my
contribution focuses on a securities law perspective on the
5. See generally KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES,
IMPLEMENTATION, AND EFFECTS 15-34 (5th ed. 2000) (reviewing the history of U.S. banking
and the development of regulatory institutions).
6. See, e.g., About the Commissio ALA. SEC. COMMISSION, http://asc.alabama.gov/
about.aspx (last visited May 24, 2016).
7. See, e.g., ALA. ST. BANKING DEP'T, http://www.banking.alabama.gov (last visited
May 24,2016).
8. See State Insuance Regulation, NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMMISSIONERS, http://www.
naic.org/documents/consutner-state-reg-brief.pdf (last visited May 24, 2016).
9. See, e.g., Licensing, Supervision, Implementation, Regulatio, FINMA,
https://www.finma.ch/en/fmma/acfivities/ (last visited May 24, 2106); cf Financial Services
Agency, FIN. SERVICES AGENCY 2-3 (Feb. 2016), http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/about/pamphlet.pdf
(describing the evolution of government organization relating to certain financial matters in
Japan).
10. See Nu Ri Jung, The Present and Future of the Financial Services Industry:
Convergence, Consolidation, Conglomeration, and Collaboration, 29 QuINNmIAc L. REv. 729,
731-33, 742, 778-79, 789 (2011) (noting the industry's global expanse).
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convergence issue and, more specifically, on some possible perils." In
introducing such perils, while focusing on the convergence issues'
overlay with the securities laws, I particularly illustrate issues
surrounding and faced by U.S. securities laws and regulators.
However, I also hope at least to raise some possible issues about
international convergence as well, in keeping with the Tulane Law
Reviews strong tradition of providing insights from comparative and
international law.
Accordingly, in Part II, I begin by identifying some practical
difficulties raised by consolidation of regulatory agencies. While
consolidation might offer some benefits, as a baseline for analysis, it is
useful to contemplate the likelihood and costs of being able to
accomplish consolidation in the near term. In Part Ill, I place these
concerns in the contemporary context of crisis-driven regulatory
changes. This context may help explain why some find consolidation
particularly attractive now as a matter of political utility, which does
not necessarily correspond to legal efficacy. This Part views potential
consolidation as a candidate for ill-advised crisis regulation, which is
problematic for the reasons explored in my prior scholarship. Of
course, even if consolidation is difficult and problematic, one also
must ask whether, absent consolidation, it is even possible for the
existing regulatory agencies to work together to solve contemporary
problems. Accordingly, in Part IV, I provide a case study of how
multiple regulators worked together, absent consolidation, to achieve
investor protection. More specifically, I explore the efforts of multiple
government regulators related to the introduction of single-stock
futures and related investor protections. With knowledge of the
possibility of cooperation addressing investor protection concerns, in
Part V, I suggest possible cooperative efforts that might be utilized
prospectively and further institutionalized to help address future
concerns related to protecting investors.
11. It is useful to note that this Article does not claim that consolidation is never
appropriate or useful. In some instances, consolidation may lead to more uniform approaches
to protecting investors and consumers. Moreover, in some nations with different markets,
resources, and overall government structures, consolidated financial authorities may make
more sense. Indeed, the size and nature of the U.S. capital market can be quite different than
that of other nations. See Vision and Reali: Animating Europe s Capital Market4
ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 2015, at 68, 68-69 (comparing the European market o the U.S.
market). My purpose is more to raise issues and potential problems related to consolidation
involving the U.S. regulatory system in the shorter term as an effort to stabilize the economy.
1214 [Vol. 90:1211
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II. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES OF CREATING A CONSOLIDATED
REGULATOR
At first glance, one must acknowledge how financial government
agency consolidation might be attractive to some regulatory reformers.
At the most basic level, the current U.S. regulatory structure's
complexity might create confusion as to which regulator is in charge of
what products, services, or other issues, which might be alleviated by a
one-stop regulatory shop. In addition, to the extent the current array of
agencies and governmental bodies regulate products and services for
the same potential set of purchasers, putting those products' and
services' regulation under the metaphorical roof of a single agency
could lead to the development of a more unified approach to
regulation.
However, such perceptions are far from incontrovertible. If
investor confusion over who regulates what matter is the true issue,
then education about appropriate government resources available to
them at the proper agency or body may be the more direct solution.
Such education ultimately may lead the investor to an individual
governmental party with more expertise in the investor's concern or
question.12 And it seems, from the investor's perspective, that the larger
concern may be the substance of the rules that protect her, rather than
who promulgates those rules.
This latter concern makes a potential consolidated regulator's
efforts to develop more uniform approaches across products ripe for
more careful consideration. In other words, would the development of
the same rules across products and services be better rules and be
more appreciated by consumers? This notion is potentially not without
controversy.
First, current differences between regulatory bodies on how they
regulate consumer products and services reflect knowing choices and
different goals for the separate regulatory schemes.13 A comparison of
the SEC and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) helps
highlight this point. When a consumer deposits money in an FDIC-
12. The SEC's Office of Investor Education and Advocacy helps facilitate this
education. See Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/oiea
(last modified Mar. 8, 2014).
13. The example that follows compares certain securities and banking regulation.
However, even within the securities regulatory scheme, regulation can vary across different
products and intermediaries, as illustrated by Professor Arthur Laby's contribution to this
Symposium. See Arthur B. Laby, Regulatory Convergence and Organizational Culture, 90
TuL. L. REv. 1181 (2016).
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insured account up to banking law's limits, a return of that money is
guaranteed, even if the bank goes out of business.'" In contrast, the
SEC does not guarantee an investor repayment should she make a poor
investment choice. SEC regulation tends to focus on disclosure and
transparency, with investors bearing the consequences of their own
choices after making decisions with information related to those
choices available.'5
Second, beyond the broader issue of possible benefits of different
regulatory goals for different products and services, in focusing on
big-picture principles across products and services, might the staff and
leadership of consolidated regulators lose track of the differences
between the financial products and services and the accompanying
differences of how one details their regulation? One aspect of the
current organizational structure of multiple agencies is that each
agency's more specific mission presumably encourages that agency to
focus on gaining and utilizing expertise in more specific areas of more
specific products and services. A securities regulator should learn
about specific securities products and services and should establish
relationships with the stakeholders, both those purchasing and selling
those products.'6 Questions arise as to whether such expertise and
relationships would develop in a megaorganization such as a
consolidated regulator overseeing many more products and services.
Notwithstanding the above discussion on possible problems with
the supposed benefits to investors that advocates of agency consoli-
dation might raise, one can still question whether those advocates or
those offering the counterarguments are correct. It is ultimately
14. See FDIC, http://fdic.gov (last visited May 24, 2016).
15. Indeed, the extensive nature of the disclosure regime over the years has led the
SEC to use regulation to better integrate the large amounts of disclosure. See I HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 3:1-:3 (2015).
16. Different techniques, such as roundtable discussions, are employed currently to
communicate with stakeholders. See, e.g., Proxy Voting Roundtable, SEC, https://www.sec.
gov/spotlightlproxy-voting-roundtable.shtml (last modified May 21, 2015); see also infia
notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing the SEC's use of roundtables and concept
releases to reach out to stakeholders).
Something else to contemplate when considering agency staff at a consolidated
regulator, as opposed to staff at separate agencies, is the uncertain effects of rent-seeking
opportunities and agency capture. Public choice theory offers insights into the importance of
considering self-interest and the motivations of bureaucrats. See James Gwartney & Richard
E. Wagner, The Public Choice Revolution, in READINGS IN PUBLIC CHOICE ECONOMICS 3 (Jac
C. Heckelman ed., 2004). In light of such insights, it is important to contemplate whether a
colossal regulator joining together multiple regulatory issues under a single roof might make
treatment of such issues more opaque and foster rent-seeking opportunities, leading to
suboptimal regulation.
1216 [Vol. 90:1211
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speculative to draw firm conclusions about a hypothetical consolidated
agency's actions. It is hard to predict with certainty how the staff of a
consolidated agency would act on investor issues or how the agency
would interact with consumers and other stakeholders in the financial
industry and markets. Accordingly, while I might share some of these
preliminary concerns about consolidation's benefits, neither I nor
others can guarantee them coming to fruition. However potentially
diminished, there may be some benefits related to a consolidated
agency. It is useful for a moment to assume, notwithstanding those
concerns, that some benefits might ultimately be achieved. However,
even in such an instance, it does not follow that consolidation would be
costless or practically possible.
Practical difficulties of creating a consolidated agency are far
more objectively likely to be realized. From a securities law
perspective, one might begin understanding this by exploring not only
the current nature of the SEC as an entity, but also the superstructure
of parties outside the SEC that are involved critically in the existing
securities regulation process.
The SEC is not a simple monolith. The internal structure of the
SEC is complex and changes over time. While the five
Commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the
United States Senate are the public face of the organization, they are
joined by approximately 4,600 staff, who reside in the Washington
D.C. headquarters and eleven offices in regions around the country.'7
In Washington, SEC activities are further divided into five divisions
and close to two-dozen additional offices that have a wide variety of
functions and subject-matter foci.'8 Changes have included the
addition of new divisions, such as the creation in 2009 of the Division
of Economic and Risk Analysis.'9 And even long-standing divisions
cycle through a variety of tasks over time." Activities in different
divisions and offices might include some or all of a variety of
functions, from general policy analysis to rulemaking, to collection
17. What We Do, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified
June 10, 2013). The nature of the relatively few Commissioners is even more complex than it
might appear at first glance because they cannot include more than three from the same
political party. Id
18. Id.; see also Secuities and Exchange Commission Organization Char; SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/images/secorg.pdf (last visited May 24, 2016) (illustrating the
organizational layout of SEC divisions and offices).
19. See Economic and Risk Analysis, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/dera (last modified
May 17, 2016).
20. See Kenneth M. Rosen et al., Lecture, PanelDiscussion: Celebrating Thirty Years
ofMarketRegulation, 9 FoRDHAm J. Con. & FIN. L. 295, 301-05 (2004).
1217
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and review of filings, to inspections, to litigation in administrative
actions and federal courts; as a result, at times various parties at the
SEC serve very different roles as policy makers, detectives, educators,
prosecutors, or judges and more.2' It is not the function of this Article
to detail the specific functions of each individual SEC office and
division. Even basic descriptions could help fill a book.2 What is
important is that the functions of the SEC and how those functions are
divided amongst personnel are not the same as at other administrative
agencies.3 Accordingly, as an initial matter, it seems naive to believe
that such functions could quickly and easily be merged with those of
other financial regulators in a consolidated agency.
The practical difficulties, however, do not end with trying to
integrate the SEC's complex internal structure with that of other
government bodies. The SEC's own staff only serves as the beginning
of its efforts to regulate capital markets. Given the size of the financial
markets, it is not surprising that the U.S. regulatory system leverages
the efforts of those outside government to help with capital market
regulation. Particularly important are self-regulatory organizations
(SRO)-nongovernmental entities with regulatory functions.25  For
example, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) is an
SRO critical to the regulation of brokers and certain markets that
engages in oversight functions of a wide variety, including member
regulation, enforcement, fraud detection, market intelligence,
adjudication, market regulation, transparency, and economic analysis.6
21. What We Do, supra note 17.
22. See, e.g., Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION (4th ed. 2001) (noting the extensive functions of the SEC).
23. Cf, e.g., The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.
consumerfmance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/ (last visited May 24, 2016) (illustrating the
organizational structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); CFTC Organizaton,
CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/About/CFTCOrganization/index.htm (last visited May 24, 2016)
(describing the structure and divisions of the CFTC).
24. Perhaps this might be simpler, albeit still difficult, if as a baseline, each existing
U.S. regulatory body had the same types of functions and was organized the same way.
However, this is not the case.
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012) (prescribing SRO regulation); see also STEVEN MARK
LEvY, REGULATION OF SECURITIES: SEC ANSWER BOOK 1-65 to -66 (4th ed. Supp. 1 2016)
("U.S. securities markets are to a large extent self-regulated by broker-dealer firms and by
self-regulatory organizations (SROs), under SEC oversight.").
26. See Oversigh4 FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/oversight (last visited May
24, 2016); About FNRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about (last visited May 24, 2016).
Interestingly, FINRA itself is the result of consolidation of some predecessor SROs related to
the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers. See Order
Approving Proposed Rule Change To Amend the By-Laws of NASD To Implement
Governance and Related Changes To Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm
1218 [Vol. 90:1211
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One of the ways that the SEC can use SROs to assist its mission in a
directed fashion is by utilizing the SEC's legislatively granted right to
review SRO rules.27  Beyond SROs, even individual market
participants have responsibilities to help maintain fair markets.28
In addition, the SEC does not only use a complex network of
securities industry participants to help oversee markets and enforce
existing policies. The SEC also reaches out to stakeholders to help
formulate policies in the first instance. This might be through actions
such as roundtables29 as well as concept releases," in anticipation of
possible formal rulemaking.
In times of limited governmental financial resources and budget
cutting,31 leveraging of knowledge, expertise, and-as is the case for
SROs especially-oversight by nongovernmental actors becomes
critical. If integration of complex individual agencies that are
structured differently and serve different functions is practically
difficult, fully integrating broader, unique regulatory networks with
those outside government, established over the course of decades and
associated with such agencies, would seem even more perilous.
It is worth noting that just as this fuller SEC regulatory network is
different from that of other U.S. financial regulators, it certainly is
different from those of regulators of other nations," making agency
consolidation at the global level an even trickier prospect. However,
stories from abroad are useful in making some additional points on the
difficulties of implementing consolidation. First, the road to
consolidation is a long one. For example, even in the limited area of
securities-focused regulation, Canada has spent decades trying to
Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
56,145, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169 (July 26, 2007). Even the consolidation of these entities'
regulatory functions was a multiyear effort. See Kenneth M. Rosen, Financial Intermedaies
as Pincipals andAgents, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 625, 635-36 (2013).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1).
28. For example, broker-dealers become part of the process through requirements
imposed upon them to supervise registered representatives who work for them. See 1
NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION §§ 9.01-.03
(4th ed. Supp. 2009) (describing the supervisory responsibilities).
29. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC To Hold Roundtable on Proxy Voting (Jan. 27,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-15.html.
30. See, e.g., Possible Revisions to Audit Committee Disclosures, Securities Act
Release No. 9862, Exchange Act Release No. 75,344, 80 Fed. Reg. 38,995 (July 8, 2015).
31. See Kristina Peterson & Nick Timiraos, Congress Passes Bill To Fund
Government Through Dec. 11, WALL STREET J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/senate-passes-
govermnent-fnding-bill-prior-to-midnight-deadline-1443623598 (last updated Sept. 30,
2015, 8:29 PM) (noting ongoing government funding issues).
32. As already noted above, some nations have single financial regulatory bodies,
while others do not.
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move from more localized regulation to the creation of a federal
securities regulator.3  Second, even regions where more formal
institutional mechanisms exist for consolidation with the express
purpose of integration, such as the EU, arguably have not achieved full
economic policy integration,34 especially on investor-related issues."
And third, even individual nations held up as models of financial
regulatory integration have reevaluated and arguably backed off from
unified authorities; for example, the United Kingdom's Financial
Services Authority has devolved into two separate entities, the
Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority.36
Notwithstanding these examples of attempted consolidation from
abroad and the above discussion of the practical difficulties of moving
toward consolidation in the United States, impracticability does not
necessarily equate to impossibility. Government-body reorganization
does sometimes occur.37  Further consideration is necessary,
33. Ben Dummett, Canada Names Chairman of Proposed National Securites
Regulator, WALL STREET J. (July 24, 2015, 5:01 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/canada-
names-chairman-of-proposed-national-securities-regulator-1437771680.
34. Recent negotiations over the Greek debt crisis and its relation to eurozone
members of the euro currency, which itself has not even attracted membership by all EU
members, shows the practical problems of convergence as well. See, e~g., Greece Debt
Crisis; EU Summit Cancelled as Talks Continue, BBC NEwS (July 12, 2015), http://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-33497353.
35. The formal EU process for policy making on company-related law is often a long
one, including the issuance of expert reports that may not even lead to full changes of policies
on this front. See, e.g., Report of the igh Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues
Related to Takeover Bids, EuR. COMISSION (Jan. 10, 2002), http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-
market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-report-en.pdf.
36. See FiN. SERVICES AutHoRIT, http://www.fsa.gov.uk (last visited May 24, 2016);
George Parker & Brooke Masters, Osborne Abolshes FSA and Boosts Bank, FIN. TIMES,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0203b99e-797f-lldf-b063-00144feabdc0.html (last updated
June 16,2010, 10:28 PM).
37. Probably one of the most recent examples was the consolidation of certain
functions in the recently created United States Department of Homeland Security. Of course,
it is not clear that the strong emotional-related factors of the new agency's creation after
September 11, 2001, are present in the financial-regulatory realm. See Creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. DEP'T HOMELAND SECuRITY, http://www.dhs.gov/
creation-department-homeland-security (last updated Sept. 24, 2015); Kelley Beaucar
Vlahos, 10 Years of DHS: Blessing or 'Bureaucratic Monstrosity', Fox NEwS (Dec. 8,
2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/20 12/12/08/10-years-dhs-blessing-or-bureaucratic-
monstrosity.html.
Even closer in time to the wake of the financial crisis-which was closely linked to
derivatives issues handled by two regulators, the SEC and CFTC-and with emotions
running high and the apparent interest of the Dodd-Frank author Representative Barney
Frank in a merger, no SEC/CFTC merger occurred, despite the fact that the merger had been
suggested for decades. See Dina ElBoghdady, Proposed Exchange Merger Brings Renewed
Calls To Consolidate SEC and CFTC, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.washington
1220
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particularly of why possible agency consolidation continues to find
advocates notwithstanding these impracticalities.
III. CONSOLIDATION AS AN ITERATION OF CRISIS REGULATION
Thorough analysis of actual or potential regulation requires
evaluation not only of the terms of regulation, but also of the context in
which that regulation is promulgated. In particular, regulation in the
wake of a crisis may raise specific types of red flags. Were agency
consolidation to move forward now, it might constitute crisis regulation
and suffer such regulation's potential drawbacks.
My previous scholarship has focused extensively on the
phenomenon of "crisis regulation"--new financial regulation quickly
promulgated in the wake of crises and scandals. As that scholarship
illustrates, crisis regulation is not unique to the most recent financial
crisis. While the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act38 (Dodd-Frank) and legislative efforts proximate in time
to Dodd-Frank's passage may constitute a more recent iteration of
crisis regulation in the wake of the last financial crisis,39 prior crises
brought their own regulatory changes, such as those embodied in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002"° following the Enron scandal.41 One of
the motivations for crisis regulation may be a desire for government
actors to quickly claim credit for solving problems that aggravate the
general public. Indeed, such actors may compete with one another to
develop bigger solutions first and to claim credit for such solutions in
the eyes of the public.
Because political actors themselves, or through their superiors,
are ultimately responsible to the public and because continued
government employment may depend on satisfying the public, this
post.com/business/economy/proposed-exchange-merger-brings-renewed-calls-to-consolidate-
sec-and-cftc/2012/12/21/29f4d34c-4bab- 1le2-b709-667035ff9029_story.html.
38. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 22, 31, 42
U.S.C. (2012)).
39. See Kenneth M. Rosen, "Who Killed Katie Coutic?" and Other Tales fom the
World of Executive Compensation Reform, 76 FORDHAM L. RE. 2907 (2008) (discussing
reform efforts in the wake of scandals and crises).
40. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18,28, 29 U.S.C.).
41. See Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing
Future Enrons, 48 ViLL. L. REv. 1097 (2003) (arguing that reporting requirements imposed
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the wake of the Enron scandal are flawed).
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should not be surprising. However, quick responsiveness2 does not
equate necessarily with optimal regulatory solutions or even with
addressing the problems that led to a crisis or scandal in the first
instance.43 Although the idea of consolidation of financial regulators in
the United States is not entirely new, given past decisions not to move
forward with consolidation and especially considering the last Part's
discussion of the practical difficulties of such consolidation, it is
interesting to consider what might motivate current advocacy of the
consolidation position.' Given the prominence of crisis regulation in
recent years, it is not illogical to contextualize some advocating agency
consolidation as proffering a grand-scheme solution to the grand-level
financial crisis that still lingers as a public concern."5
To the extent one is emboldened to push agency consolidation
forward as a quick fix to the fundamental issues of investor protection
that continue to exist after the crisis, those analyzing such advocates'
proposals will find useful my categorization of concerns with this
crisis-regulation approach on another issue. In particular, my prior
work examining the issue of executive compensation reform illustrates
this point.
In that work, I looked at congressional crisis regulation on
executive compensation reform as illustrating troubling competition
between the legislative and executive branches." More specifically, I
examined a congressional proposal to force the SEC to adopt specific
disclosure reforms related to compensation, even as the SEC had just
moved forward with new rules in this area.7 This led me to identify
multiple concerns created by such crisis regulation.
First, the legislation seemed to constitute part of a trend of the
United States Congress to impose untailored regulatory solutions on
executive agencies; rather than allowing the SEC to utilize its expertise
42. It is interesting that in 2015, many appear to perceive us still to be in the wake of
the financial crisis and its aftermath. In part, this likely is because of spin-off crises that
linger in a very serious way, such as the previously mentioned debt crisis in Europe. See
Greece Debt Cnsis: EUSummit Cancelled as Talks Continue, supra note 34.
43. See, e.g., Fisch & Rosen, supra note 41, at 1112-22 (noting the mismatch of
required SEC attorney responsibility rules with the solution of the underlying Enron
problems).
44. See ElBoghdady, supra note 37 (noting the SEC/CFTC merger example).
45. This is not to suggest this as a universal motivation. Again, suggestions of
governmental consolidation are not entirely new, and some have advocated it for a long time.
The point here is that for those who might wish to have consolidation as a quick fix for crises,
crisis-regulation dangers may accompany such efforts.
46. SeeRosen, supra note 39, at 2909-10.
47. See id. at 2923.
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and existing authority to tailor regulatory solutions after careful
consideration and consultation with a variety of stakeholders through
the administrative rulemaking process to see if the SEC's solutions
worked, the legislation sought to tell the SEC that it must promulgate
additional rules with legislatively prescribed content." My analysis
emphasized how, in contrast, the SEC's more deliberative administra-
tive rulemaking process that had preceded congressional involvement
in this instance unveiled specific problems with the SEC's original
proposed rule, which were corrected before the rule went into effectY.
Second, the legislation failed to recognize fully the role of reform
synergies."0  Reform-synergy issues come in different forms. For
example, when multiple government actors with regulatory authority
decide to address problems related to the same crisis or scandal, too
little appreciation may be given to how these different efforts interact
with each other." One might think of this as proper regulatory
sequencing, where it may be very sensible to see whether the first
promulgated regulatory solution works before rushing to add another
solution that is dependent upon, or perhaps even at odds with, the first.
This reemphasizes the need for deliberative creation of regulation,
rather than regulation forged in the crucible of scandal." Another
synergy issue is how crisis regulation on some subjects affects the
prospects of addressing other problems brought out by a crisis that
require reform.3 In other words, when determining how one reform
affects another, one should not only look at how reforms on the same
subject have synergistic effects, but also expand one's analysis to a
broader array of reforms.
Third, the legislation did not consider hidden costs, especially as
they relate to an agency's ability to prioritize some reforms over others,
given limited resources to engage in rulemaking and other types of
regulatory activities. As Congress imposes regulatory structures in
legislation, it necessarily may limit agency efforts to deal with other,
more important problems first.'
48. Id at 2927-30.
49. See id at 2910-23.
50. Id. at 2930-31.
51. See id.
52. See Kenneth M. Rosen, Mickey, Can You Spare a Dime? DisneyWar, Executive
Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Business Law Pedagogy, 105 MICH. L. REv.
1151, 1166-68 (2007) (book review).
53. See Rosen, supra note 39, at 2931.
54. See id at 2932; see also Examining the Settlement Practices of US. Financial
Regulators. Hearing Before the H Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 48-49 (2012)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Kenneth M. Rosen, Professor of Law, The University of
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Although executive compensation and agency consolidation are
different subjects for crisis reforms, the three categories of concerns
expressed above potentially apply to both. Ultimately, the
methodology for consolidating agencies would be legislative action
that imposes the will of Congress on executive agencies, arguably in
the most extreme way-in imposing consolidation, not only would
Congress fail to leave discretion to agencies to take a first stab at the
crisis-related problems it perceives to be fixing through consolidation,
but Congress would go even further than imposing a policy solution by
constraining how existing agency personnel organize themselves to
analyze and address problems. Congress would do so by saying that
agency staff must reorganize with other regulators in the consolidated
agency. The deliberative rulemaking processes of the old agencies
would thus be undermined.55
Agency consolidation also potentially triggers regulatory-synergy
costs. Given the still-recent nature of the financial crisis, major
legislative initiatives already undertaken to deal with the crisis, such as
Dodd-Frank, and ongoing efforts by agencies to attempt to implement
new regulatory mandates that Congress has already imposed, it is hard
not to imagine the possibility of major disruption that might be caused
by agency consolidation at this time. It is useful to explore this point.
The SEC has been reporting on its efforts on the mandatory
rulemaking required by Dodd-Frank, which remained incomplete
going into the fall of 2015.56 SEC Chair Mary Jo White, in a statement
on Dodd-Frank's five-year anniversary, noted the breadth of both the
efforts taken in the implementation of the statute and the SEC's
initiative in response to issues raised in financial markets. It is useful
to provide much of the statement in the Chair's own words to illustrate
the synergy issue:
The Commission and our fellow regulators have been working hard to
strengthen our nation's financial systems by implementing the rules
mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act and by enacting other critical reforms
to protect investors and our markets....
Alabama School of Law) (noting the significance of agency freedom to allocate resources,
including in their enforcement programs).
55. This is not to suggest hat Congress inherently always must leave agencies in their
current forms. But as I suggest in my prior work, Congress often operates best when it
identifies problems with agency operations through the oversight process before choosing the
nuclear-type solution of imposing congressional will, which would be more appropriate for
situations of agency recalcitrance. See Rosen, supra note 39, at 293340.
56. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last modified June 1, 2016).
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The Commission has taken action to address virtually all of the
mandatory rulemaking provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, and at the
same time we have focused on additional measures to bolster our
financial infrastructure. Within a year of the legislation taking effect,
the Commission began bringing greater transparency and oversight to
hedge fund and other private fund advisers with an extensive series of
reforms. The Commission also established stronger standards for the
clearinghouses that stand at the center of the global financial system
and built an enhanced program for their supervision.
Since I became Chair a little more than two years ago, the agency
has continued to advance reforms for stronger, more resilient financial
markets. Working with our fellow financial regulators, we finalized the
Volcker Rule's restrictions on proprietary trading and investments by
banks. To combat the inflated credit ratings that contributed to the
crisis, the Commission adopted a comprehensive package of reforms to
the governance and management of the credit rating agencies. We put
in place the foundational rules for a new regulatory framework for
security-based swaps.
The Commission set up new safeguards to protect municipalities and
investors in the municipal securities markets from conflicted advice and
unregulated advisors. We adopted wide-ranging rules for the asset-
backed securities market that increase the accountability of securitizers
and better protect investors. And we proposed a suite of mandated rules
to improve the transparency of executive compensation and require
executives to pay back compensation that they were awarded
erroneously.
The overarching objective of these rulemakings is to promote the
long-term sustainability of the U.S. financial system. That is also the
objective of the other powerful tools that the Dodd-Frank Act gave the
SEC, such as the whistleblower award program and other enhancements
to the SEC's enforcement authority. The whistleblower program has
increased the efficiency of our program by expanding whistleblower
protections and remedies for retaliation while creating powerful
incentives for whistleblowers to come forward with evidence of
financial wrongdoing.
While the worst of the financial crisis is behind us, the Commission
intensively continues its critical work beyond the Dodd-Frank Act to
fulfill our obligation to protect investors, enhance market stability, and
promote capital formation. Doing so today requires a dynamic,
persistent assessment of the risks to investors and markets, as well as to
the financial system as a whole.
To address the risk of a recurrence of the investor runs we saw during
the crisis, for example, we adopted transformative rules that will
fundamentally change the way money market funds operate. We also
now require additional safeguards from the broker-dealers who manage
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customers' securities and cash. And we are continually working to
assess and address specific elements of today's equity market structure
to optimize them in the interests of investors and public companies.
The Dodd-Frank Act was designed to strengthen our financial
system, and the Commission has furthered that goal both through our
implementation of the statute and through our own initiatives. Lasting
reform--not just "checking the box" for a list of rules-is the only way
we can safeguard against another financial crisis. With increased
transparency, better investor protections, and new regulatory tools, the
Commission continues to work towards a stronger marketplace and
financial future for all Americans.57
Chair White's statement suggests the enormity of the number of
regulatory changes affecting issues such as investor protection, even
primarily from the SEC's perspective and in about only a five-year
period. Notwithstanding her report card on the high overall percentage
of completed mandatory rulemakings-and indeed, the SEC already
has completed at least sixty-one of these rulemakings-by the SEC's
own count, some rules still remain for final adoption.8 Again, the
regulatory-synergies issue and regulatory sequencing center on seeing
how reforms play out before implementing additional reforms that
might not work most effectively with the prior ones. It seems
unfathomable that one can determine whether the huge volume of
reforms already undertaken-or already mandated to be undertaken-
have been in place long enough to solve adequately earlier problems or
do not solve them in a way that indicates broader institutional reform,
such as agency consolidation, is needed as an alternative solution.
The synergy issue on this point links closely to the regulatory
prioritization concern for crisis regulation as well. Congress already
has required agency officials to devote an enormous amount of
resources to mandatory rulemakings under Dodd-Frank. As just
explained, all items on the task list have not been entirely
accomplished.59 Requiring agency consolidation presumably would
create a long, new list of tasks to integrate staffs of the various
agencies, which would further take resources away from other
rulemakings that he regulatory staff might view as critical and from
other regulatory efforts, such as investor education and enforcement of
57. Mary Jo White, Statement on the Anniversary of the Dodd-Frank Ac SEC (July
16, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/statement-on-the-anniversary-of-the-dodd-
frank-act.html (emphasis omitted).
58. See Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Ac 4 supra note 56.
59. See id.
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already-existing rules. Resources likely also would be drained from
cutting-edge projects that Chair White's statement implies are
significant, such as addressing the globalized nature of markets.
This likely would not only be an issue for securities-related
investor protection issues, but also ones under the current consumer
financial product regulatory umbrella. Dodd-Frank also created the
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).6 The CFPB was
tasked with a wide array of responsibilities, from education to
enforcement, to research, to rulemaking, with a special consumer
focus." Controversy over its existence and the confirmation of its
leader already hindered the CFPB from starting to address its agenda.62
Accordingly, it is unclear how existing CFPB regulation would
synergize with regulation in these areas under a consolidated regulator,
given the slow start in creating these new regulations. And reopening
the wounds related to the CFPB leadership and organization
controversies as part of an agency-consolidation process likely would
further subtract from dedicating resources to its variety of tasks
already identified at its inception.
The above concerns expressed about consolidation certainly
counsel caution on any regulator consolidation project, but they do not
complete the story. Even if consolidation is undesirable, more limited
convergence is not necessarily undesirable. Some issues that are
related to protections of product end users do cross over between
regulators. It would provide some comfort if effective mechanisms
existed for existing agencies to cooperate to coordinate their
approaches on these issues.
IV. A CASE STUDY OF COOPERATION
As an initial matter, it is useful to establish that cooperation and
coordination between existing regulators on issues affecting the
individuals under their care is possible. Fortunately, this is not only a
possibility, but something that can be done effectively. A short
discussion of an example-the regulatory framework for the
introduction of single-stock futures63 and other defined security futures
60. The Bureau, supra note 23.
61. Id
62. See Jim Puzzanghera, GOP Stalls Confirmation of Consumer Agency Nominee,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/201 /sep/07/business/la-fi-consumer-
bureau-cordray-20110907.
63. A "single-stock future" is a contract for the delivery of a stock at a future date for
an agreed-upon price. See Single Stock Future, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT
TERMS (9th ed. 2014).
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products in U.S. markets under the Commodity Futures Modernization
Act of 2000' (CFMA) and related efforts of the SEC and CFTC to
share regulatory responsibilities related to the relevant products-will
prove useful.65
For numerous years prior to the CFMA's enactment, the Shad-
Johnson Accord banned trading these futures.' To end the ban, it
became necessary to determine whether these futures should be treated
as securities or commodity futures, which, in turn, would affect
whether the SEC or CFTC possessed regulatory authority over the
products.67
Early versions of legislation advocated by some parties would
have bifurcated regulatory treatment of the products depending on
whether the futures traded on securities or futures exchanges.8 The
SEC cautioned that this might create regulatory arbitrage opportu-
nities, as well as potentially unequal investor protections for purchasers
depending on whom they bought the futures from.9 For instance,
securities law traditionally focuses on the need for securities
intermediaries to determine the suitability of investments.
70
64. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app.
E, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-365 to -461 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12,
15 U.S.C. (2012)).
65. For a discussion of shared regulation as it specifically relates to the regulation of
financial intermediaries--broker-dealers and futures commission merchants who often help
consumers trade-see Rosen, supra note 26, at 627-28, 635-42. See also 2 EDWARD E
GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES
MARKETS § 13.04[3] (1lth ed. 2015) (discussing the exceptions and exemptions from
mandatory clearing and trading).
66. See Bloomberg News, Single-Stock Futures Trading Ban May End, L.A. TIMES
(May 9, 2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/may/09/business/fi-28014. Prior Chairs of
the SEC and CFTC agreed to this decision after questions arose as to which agency possessed
jurisdiction over such products. See Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96
Stat. 2294 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 15, 18, 29 U.S.C.); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-89, CFTC AND SEC: ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHAD-
JOHNSON JURISDICTIONAL ACCORD 2-7 (2000).
67. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 66, at 5-7; William Neikirk,
Gramm, Lugar Confident of Futures Bill Passage, Cm. TRIB. (May 12, 2000), http://arficles.
chicagotribune.com/2000-05-12/business/0005120282_1_single-stock-futures-commodity-
futures-trading-commission-senators.
68. See MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20560, THE COMMODITY
FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT 5 (2003).
69. See Annette L. Nazareth, Testimony Concerning H.R. 4541, the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, SEC (June 4, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/
testimony/ts 102000.htm.
70. See HAZEN, supia note 2, § 14.16; see also Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R.
Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions; 54 Bus. LAW. 1557 (1999) (noting the
significance of the suitability doctrine).
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The Chairs of the SEC and CFTC ultimately composed a joint
regulatory plan for these futures that largely was incorporated into the
CFMA's final enacted version.7 The CFMA treats the products as
both securities and futures, and markets and intermediaries trading the
products need to register with both agencies to submit themselves to
the different regulatory schemes." Special "notice" registration was
made available to limit the administrative burden of complying with
both the securities and futures regulatory frameworks.3
Armed with the knowledge that cooperation is possible, as
illustrated by the single-stock-future narrative, next it is useful to
provide some ideas on how cooperation between regulators can be
encouraged and facilitated.
V. FACILITATING COOPERATION
Even if massive agency consolidation may be ill-advised, room
for improvement exists on how the current multiagency system, with
different actors focused on protecting investors and consumers,
operates. In a world of multiple regulatory actors, more attention
should be paid to how to facilitate those actors' cooperation and
coordination.74 In this Part, I briefly describe some existing coopera-
tion mechanisms and how these or new cooperation mechanisms
might be enhanced. Hopefully, this will provide ideas for discussion
not only at this Symposium, but also for future research.
A. Utilized Me hanisms
As a starting point, it is useful to recognize that the separate
government actors already do not act in bubbles, unaware of and
noncommunicative with their fellow regulators. Interactions between
actors may be informal or on a one-off basis, but their dealings with
one another at times have been facilitated by ongoing groupings.
While it is not within the scope of this Article to consider all such
arrangements, some examples at the domestic and international levels
highlight this point.
Recall that in the single-stock-futures narrative, the Chairs of the
SEC and CFTC came together to present a way for Congress to meld
71. See JICKLING, supm note 68.
72. News Story Supplement Summary of SEC/CFTC Agreement SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/cftcagre.htm (last modified Sept. 19, 2000).
73. Id.
74. Cf Rosen, supra note 39, at 2936-38 (discussing the role of Congress in
coordination).
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the two agencies' regulatory expertise, schemes, and efforts to help
protect investors related to the newly permitted security futures
products. However, this was not the first time these regulators
encountered each other. They had experience with each other. Both
were members of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets
(Working Group). That group, which President Ronald Reagan
initially endorsed by a presidential executive order, consisted of the
leaders of the SEC, the CFTC, the Fed, and the Treasury.75 Although
presidential endorsement of the Working Group may have been
inspired at that time by the famed market break of 1987,76 the Working
Group has operated over numerous years. In this continuing
engagement, the Working Group even undertook its own research and
produced publications as new issues arrived in a variety of subject-
matter areas.77
Such groupings can be even more formalized with both
congressional and presidential endorsement. More recently, a statute
established the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).78 Under
the statutory mandate, there is
75. SeeExec. Order No. 12,631, 3 C.ER. § 559 (1989).
76. For instance, the 1988 executive order noted the Working Group's purposes and
functions, some of which directly referenced the market break of 1987:
Recognizing the goals of enhancing the integrity, efficiency, orderliness, and
competitiveness of our Nation's financial markets and maintaining investor
confidence, the Working Group shall identify and consider:
(1) the major issues raised by the numerous studies on the events in the
financial markets surrounding October 19, 1987, and any of those
recommendations that have the potential to achieve the goals noted above;
and
(2) the actions, including governmental actions under existing laws and
regulations (such as policy coordination and contingency planning), that are
appropriate to carry out these recommendations.
Id.
77. See, e.g., Working Grp., The Long-Term Availability and Affordability of
Insurance for Terrorism Risk, TREASURY (Apr. 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/
reports-and-notices/Documents/PWGTerrorismRisklnsuranceReportc2014.pdf; Working
Grp., Money Market Fund Reform Options, TREASURY (Oct. 2010), https://wwwtreasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases!Documents/10.21%20PWG%20Report%/o20Final.pdf; Working
Grp., Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments, TREASURY (Mar. 2008),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fm-mkts/Documents/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil-
03122008.pdf.
78. Council voting members include the Treasury Secretary, the Chair of the Fed, the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Director of the CFPB, the SEC Chair, the FDIC Chair, the
CFTC Chair, the Federal Housing Finance Agency Director, the National Credit Union
Administration Chair, and a presidentially appointed insurance expert. Financial Stabiity
Oversight Council" About FSOC, TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx (last updated May 19, 2015,
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collective accountability for identifying risks and responding to
emerging threats to financial stability. It is a collaborative body chaired
by the Secretary of the Treasury that brings together the expertise of the
federal financial regulators, an independent insurance xpert appointed
by the President, and state regulators.
The Council has important new authorities to constrain excessive
risk in the financial system. For instance, the Council has the authority
to designate a nonbank financial firm for tough new supervision to help
minimize the risk of such a firm from threatening the stability of the
financial system.
Additionally, to help with the identification of emerging risks to
financial stability, the FSOC can provide direction to, and request data
and analyses from, the newly created Office of Financial Research
(OFR) housed within Treasury.79
Like the Working Group, FSOC and its related staff have produced
reports on several subjects-for FSOC, sometimes this is pursuant to
specific congressional mandate." But as a newer cooperation
enterprise, FSOC is especially worth watching because not only does
FSOC have the formality of statutory endorsement, but it also has
more particularized powers, such as the abilities to designate entities
4:26 PM). However, as noted below, additional stakeholders-such as state insurance,
banking, and securities commissioners-are included in an advisory capacity. Id.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., FSOC, Report to Congress on Study of a Contingent Capital
Requirement for Certain Nonbank Financial Companies and Bank Holding Companies,
TREASURY (July 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Documents/Co%20co
%20study/o5B2%5D.pdf; FSOC, Report to the Congress on Actions Taken in Response to
the US. Government Accountabiity Otflce Report Entitled 'National Credit Union
Administration: Earlier Actions Are Needed To Better Address Troubled Credit UnionS"
TREASURY (June 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-repofts/Documents/
Report/o20to%20the%20Congress%20on%20Actions%20Taken%20in°%20Response% 20to
%20the%20U.S.%20GAO's%20Report/o20on%20National%20Credit%/o20Union%20Admin
istration.pdf; FSOC, Report to the Congress on Prompt Corrective Action, TREASURY (Dec.
2011), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/FSOC%20PCA
%20Report/o20FINAL.pdf; FSOC, Report to the Congress on Secured Creditor Haircuts,
TREASURY (July 2011), https://www.treasury.gov/iritiatives/Documents/Report/20to%20
Congress%20on%20Secured%2OCreditor/o20Haircuts.pdf; FSOC, Study & Recommenda-
tions on Prohibitions on Propnetary Trading & Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds &
Private Equity Funds, TREASURY (Jan. 2011), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
Volcker/o2osec%20%2061 9%20study%/o20final%201%201 8%201 l%20rg.pdf; FSOC, Study
& Recommendations Regarding Concentration Limits on Large Financial Companies,
TREASURY (Jan. 2011), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Study/20on%20
Concentration%20Limits%20on%2OLarge%20Firms%2001-17-11 .pdf; Chairperson of
FSOC, Study of the Effects of Size and Complexity of Financial Institutions on Capital





that pose risks to financial stability81 and to engage in rtlemakingY
Although FSOC is relatively new, it has engaged in numerous
activities, and it is interesting as a coordinating mechanism; FSOC
frequently takes account of member actions to give a more
comprehensive view of total risk regulation in the United States.83
Cooperation and coordination mechanisms certainly are not
limited to domestic efforts such as those described above. In the
securities world, for example, the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has brought together securities
regulators for cooperation and coordination projects since 1983; as of
last fall, IOSCO had grown to 200 members from its initial I1 '
IOSCO certainly is not vested with the authority to impose specific
laws regarding investor protection or other matters on member states
that might be seen as full convergence;" thus, it is interesting how it
accomplishes its work. IOSCO has opted to try to draw up consensus
documents to get members at least to agree to shared principles as they
undergo their own work in their jurisdictions.
Notably, in 2010, IOSCO issued its "Objectives and Principles of
Securities Regulation."6  Protecting investors is among the three
regulatory objectives. While not prescribing the exact content of
regulations for members, the document provides a shared sense of how
each should proceed with the regulatory enterprise. In addition to
81. Financial Stability Oversight Council: Designations, TREAsURY, http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx (last updated July 27, 2015, 4:38
PM).
82. Financial Stability Oversight Council Rulemaking, TREASURY, http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/fsod/rulemaking/Pages/default.aspx (last updated Feb. 4, 2015, 5:44
PM).
83. See FSOC, 2015 Annual RepoZ TREASURY 87-104 (2015), http://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-reports/Documents/2015 %2OFSOC%2OAnnual%2OReport.pdf.
84. See About IOSCO, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=aboutiosco
(last visited May 24, 2016).
85. In the securities context, the difficulties of achieving greater consolidation and
fuller international convergence are illustrated by the stagnation over the last decade of efforts
to achieve a broad mutual-recognition regime in the United States. Mutual recognition
essentially involves one jurisdiction that is comfortable enough with the laws of another such
that the jurisdiction forgoes certain regulation of entities from the other that came to the
jurisdiction's borders, because the laws of the other jurisdiction are sufficiently akin to its
own. See Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-BorderAccess to US.
Investors: A New Internanonal Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 31, 32 (2007) (proposing that
certain foreign entities dealing with U.S. persons not be required to register in the United
States conditionally, based on other types of substituted compliance).
86. See Objectives and Pinciples of Secuties Regula o IOSCO (June 2010),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf.
87. Seeid at 3.
88. See id. at 4-12.
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such general pronouncements, the organizational structure of LOSCO
utilizes a committee system for more specific, substantive discussions
and initiatives on particular subject matters. For example, Committee
8 focuses on issues related to retail investors, especially financial
literacy and investor education, as well as advising the JOSCO Board
on investor protection matters for retail customers.89 With such
standing committees in place, JOSCO can ascertain what members are
doing and thus where regulation might need to go.'
Just as cooperative bodies in the United States work on issues
such as financial risk, international fora exist for doing so as well. The
Financial Stability Board (FSB) and its predecessor, the Financial
Stability Forum (FSF), exemplify these bodies. In the wake of the
Asian Financial Crisis in 1999, the FSF came into existence; it
followed a call by the Group of 7 Ministers and Governors for new
structures to increase cooperation among financial institutions and
supervisory bodies around the globe.91 The FSF would identify
systemic vulnerabilities, suggest possible actions to address problems,
and help coordinate financial authorities in maintaining stability.2
Notwithstanding aspirations surrounding its creation, FSF's
actual efforts proved insufficient to prevent the instability surrounding
the 2008 financial crisis.9" FSF itself reflected upon its work, for
example, when its Chairman, Mario Draghi, explained, "In response to
the challenges presented by the global financial situation, and
recognizing the global nature of financial markets, we believe that the
FSF must expand to a broader membership of emerging economies.94
Ultimately, in April 2009, the FSB replaced the FSE"
89. Committee on Retail Investors (Committee 8), IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/
about/?subsection=display-.committee&cmtid=20 (last visited May 24, 2016).
90. For example, IOSCO's "Final Report on Sound Practices for Investment Risk
Education" utilized the experience of Committee 8 members to proffer its findings. See Bd.
of IOSCO, Sound Pmctices for Investment Risk Education: Final Repor4 IOSCO 22-48
(Sept. 2015), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD505.pdf.
91. OurHistory, FSB, http://www.fsb.org/about/history/ (last visited May 24, 2016).
92. Jason Liberi, Comment, The Financial Stability Forum: A Step in the Right
Direction... Not Far Enough, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 549, 567 (2003).
93. Some have criticized the poor precrisis efforts of the FSE See, e.g., Enrique R.
Carrasco, The Global Financial Cisis and the Financial Stability Forum: The Awakening and
Trnsfornation ofan InternationalBody, 19 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROos. 203, 207-08
(2010); Cally Jordan, Does "F" Stand for Failure: The Legacy of the Financial Stability
Forum (Melbourne Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 429, 2009), http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/abstractid= 1478527.
94. Press Release, FSF, Financial Stability Forum Chairman Supports the G20 Call
To Broaden the FSF's Membership (Nov. 13, 2008), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/
pr_081113.pdf (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Ouristoy, supra note 91.
TULANE LA W RE VIEW
Changes for the new entity included increased membership and a
more formal organizational structure, including leadership positions, a
steering committee, and consensus-based decision making for plenary
matters." These new structures also reflected the aspirations for a
better global economy expressed at the now similarly expanded G20
group of nations, which hoped to "establish the much greater
consistency and systematic cooperation between countries, and the
fiamework of internationally agreed high standards, that a global
financial system requires."97 Later, in a 2011 declaration, the G20
reached a consensus to "strengthen FSB's capacity, resources and
governance" by giving the FSB "a corresponding institutional
standing, with legal personality and greater financial autonomy."" By
2013, the FSB became a not-for-profit entity under Swiss law."
This is not to suggest that today's FSB constitutes legally binding
convergence of international financial law.' Rather, the FSB
"operates by moral suasion and peer pressure" to form standards that
members commit to implementing.' Members can "recuse
themselves at any time" from the FSB's activities or policy making
when they "are not consistent with [the members'] legal or policy
frameworks."'0 2 Presumably, the sanction for failing to comply is the
reputational harm of doing so. ' Notwithstanding such limitations, the
96. Stephany Griffith-Jones et al., Introduction and Overvew, in THE FINANCIAL
STABILITY BOARD: AN EFFECTvE FoURTH PILLAR OF GLOBAL ECONOMIc GOVERNANCE? 6, 7
(Stephany Griffith-Jones et al. eds., 2010), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/
FSB%20special%20report_2.pdf.
97. London Summit-Leaders' Statement IMF 3-4 (Apr. 2, 2009), https://www.
imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf
98. 2011 Cannes Summit Final Declaration, G20 INFO. CTR. (Nov. 4, 2011), http://
www.g20.utoronto.ca/2011/2011-cannes-declaration- 111104-en.html.
99. Our History, supra note 91; see also Thomas Spencer & Elizabeth Hipwell,
Coordinating, Mandating, Monitoring: What Can the Post-2015 Climate Regime Learn from
Global Financial Govemance, 2013 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REv. 293, 299 ("The transition
from the FSF to the FSB was intended ... to strengthen its authority, relevance and
independence, and thus ultimately its efficacy.").
100. See What We Do, FSB, http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/ (last visited May 24,
2016).
101. Id
102. Articles ofAssociadon of the Financial Stabiliy Board (FSB), FSB 3 (Jan. 28,
2013), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/AoA-26-March-2015-FINAL.pdf.
103. See Adam S. Posen, Testimony Submitted to the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Hearing on 'The Role of the Financial Stability Board in the US
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FSB hopefully is better positioned to find and address potential
systemic problems.'"
While they may not be perfect and are subject to improvement
over time, the story of these domestic and international cooperation
and coordination organizations indicates that they have the potential to
evolve and expand and to serve significant functions over time. That
makes it useful to briefly identify some ideas for the regulatory-
coordination agenda going forward.
B. Ideas for Improvement
In briefly identifying ideas for regulatory cooperation institutions
and a coordination agenda going forward, it is useful to frame the
discussion as a set of principles for the agenda.
First, products of regulator cooperation likely will only be as
good as the inputs from separate regulators engaged in the
cooperation. Stated slightly differently, to be the best participants in
collaborative processes, those participants need to put their own houses
in order as they begin to engage in those processes. While this may
seem clearly evident, certain hazards might prevent such self-reflection
and hard work from happening. Unfortunately, under some
circumstances, without preventive tactics, a shirking story may occur;
temptation might exist to blame problems on the coordination
organization, rather than its members."'
The last Part, for instance, told the story of the demise of the FSF
and noted the critique of the FSF for failing to predict the 2008
financial crisis.'" Such a critique may be warranted, but it is
dangerous to stop there. Nations making up the FSF individually did
not adequately anticipate the crisis and engaged in policies that may
have provoked the crisis. Even if the coordinating organization has
some of its own staff, it is unlikely that it will have the capacity to do
the heavy lifting without the active engagement of the membership.
This is a benefit of the IOSCO committee approach noted above,'7 in
104. See Michael S. Barr, Whos i Chage of Global Finance?, 45 GEo. J. INT'L L.
971, 998 (2014) ("[The FSB makes it] harder for concerns to fall between the cracks of
narrowly focused standard-setting bodies.").
105. Professor Hilary Allen, another participant at this Symposium, also has raised
concerns about shirking by regulators. See Hilary J. Allen, Financial Stability Regulation as
Indirect Investor/Consumer Protection Regulation: -Implications for Regulatory Mandates
and Structure, 90 TUL. L. REv. 1113 (2016).
106. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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which member participants are relied upon explicitly as part of the
process of creating collaborative products.
Second, specific tasks on a detailed agenda may yield specific
results. One takeaway from the examples utilized in this Article might
be that more detailed organizational structures of cooperation entities
create better coordination results.'°8  However, the fact that an
organization has more formal committees does not mean it necessarily
will get more done. A more nuanced view is that an organization is
assisted by possessing mechanisms that generate a detailed, robust
project list. The value of a committee at IOSCO that focuses
specifically on retail investors and education is that it hopefully
includes members interested in and motivated to act on these particular
issues with specific ideas on how to proceed. For example,
knowledgeable committee members may become aware in their home
jurisdictions of particularly complex financial products that befuddle
investors, leading to a specific project or report that relates to those
products, which may positively impact investors.
Third, and closely related to the last two principles, cooperative
organizations benefit from substantial research resources. Moreover,
these resources must be adequate to engage in both backward-looking
and proactive analysis. Just as crisis spurs regulation, it also becomes
easy fodder for research for many," myself included. Certainly,
coordinating organizations need resources to study why crises
occurred, and resources for that task may be forthcoming, given the
angst and calls for action following a crisis. Understanding past
problems is certainly one component of preventing future ones, but so
is identifying new issues and new forms of problems."'
This raises the question of how a coordinating body might
identify the new problems through research and also reveal areas ripe
for cooperative efforts to address those problems. A starting point may
be to establish a research baseline. As noted, today's studies by
108. For example, discussion of the transition from the FSF to the FSB noted the
inclusion of more formal organizational structures. See supra text accompanying note 96.
109. See William Poole, Essay, Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of
2007-2009, 33 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 421 (2010); Financial Cisis Inquiry Commission,
[2010] 31 Bank Dig. Online (CCH) 618 (Feb. 17. 2010) (noting a forum to discuss crisis
causes).
110. One should not forget that given the regulatory-synergy and related concerns
identified earlier, the new issues should include methodical study of reforms as promulgated,
in order to become more informed prior to additional reform enactment.
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regulators often focus on what caused a major problem after the fact.'
However, there are examples of especially forward-thinking
assessments of the regulatory landscape that seek to more broadly
assess the current state of affairs in an effort to lay the groundwork for
regulatory approaches in the future. In the securities world, one of the
most famous examples is the 1963 so-called "Special Study."' 2 A
more recent example is the "Market 2000" report. This report, actually
published in 1994, provides a forward-looking comprehensive
exploration of the current state of equity markets, in anticipation of
recommendations for future regulatory approaches."3 Such research
projects are useful models for new ones that might occur with some
variations. For example, in an increasingly globalized economy, it
would be useful for regulators participating in a cooperative
organization to get back to the basics and simply provide research
findings on the state of different types of markets in securities and
other consumer financial products in countries around the world.'4
This does not mean that the exact topics from older basic market
studies should be the sole domain of a new, comprehensive global
study. Some newer topics that might be useful to emphasize could
include the impact of technology on markets. Financial product
transactions increasingly are occurring through complex networks and
technology-driven platforms. The state of the "new" market structure
is rapidly evolving and critical to understand. Signs exist of potential
future problems such as electronic trading stumbles."5 One should not
111. See, e.g., Mark Carlson, A Bnief Istory of the 1987 Stock Market Crash i+Yth a
Discussion of the FedemlReserve Response (Fed, Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary
Affairs, Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2007-13, 2006).
112. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. No. 88-95 (1963).
113. See Div. OF MKT. REGULATION, SEC, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF
CURRENT EQUITY MARKET DEVELOPMENTS (1994).
114. While this may seem like a massive undertaking, models exist for international
assessment as well. For example, the World Bank annually completes a "Doing Business"
report that assesses business regulations for firms in over 180 nations; topics explored include
how nations protect investors. See, e.g., World Bank Grp., Doing Business 2015.: Going
Beyond Efficiency, DOING Bus. (2014), http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/GIAWB/
Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB15-Full-Report.pdf. One of the
ways the World Bank accomplishes this enormous task every year is by leveraging private
resources and calling on individual experts around the world to help with the research. See
id. at 15-23. Of course, some may critique how well such assessments reflect reality. See,
e.g., Pulling Rank: The Doing Business Repor ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 2015, at 77 (offering
critiques of the "Doing Business" report). However, the assessments may help to move a
dialogue on assessment techniques forward.
115. See, e.g., Jose Pagliery, Tech Fail! Explaining Today 3 Big Computer Errors,
CNNMONEY (July 8, 2015, 2:13 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/08/technology/united-
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wait for these problems to have more catastrophic effects before
further study."6  Technology also makes more complex financial
derivative products possible, and a more systematic study of
derivatives' use around the globe would be useful."'
Of course, more traditional topics also are ripe for additional
exploration, especially microlevel issues of investor protection. In the
wake of the financial crisis, much emphasis has been placed on the
largest players in markets, especially given public angst about bailouts
of large financial institutions."8  This may obscure issues facing
smaller, retail investors who also are critical market participants,
collectively placing their dollars in capital markets that fuel the U.S.
economy. More research should focus on issues such as broker-dealer
regulation because those financial intermediaries deal with retail
customers."9
A fourth principle for the broader cooperation agenda is to ensure
a focus on, and contribution of, adequate resources for enforcement, in
addition to research and policy making. It may garner more attention
in some instances to be the regulator who discovers a problem or
comes up with a new rule to address a problem, but no matter how
well reforms are conceptualized, they likely will be irrelevant if new
rules are not enforced. Moreover, sometimes better enforcement of
existing rules might be a better alternative to spending limited
resources on promulgating new rules.'2
Some progress on cooperative enforcement efforts is being made
at the domestic level. In November 2009, President Barack Obama
created the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Task Force),
joining the efforts of over two dozen agencies, regulators, and
nyse-wsj-downl/ (discussing computer problems at the New York Stock Exchange, United
Airlines, and the Wall StreetJournal).
116. See Jim Zarroli, NYSE Halts Trading After Computer System Issues, NPR (July
8, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/08/421225034/nyse-halts-trading-after-
computer-system-issues (noting the New York Stock Exchange stoppage, which, on this
occasion, did not cause stocks to plummet).
117. See Jonathan Lindenfeld, Note, The CFTCs Substituted Compliance Approach:
An Attempt To Bnng About Global Harmony and Stability in the Derivatives Marke 14 J.
INT'L Bus. & L. 125, 125 (2015) (noting the CFTC Chair's remarks that risks do not know
borders).
118. See Emily Stephenson & David Henry, Bank Regulators Gain Ground Against
Too-Big-To-Fail Bailouts, REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2013, 1:52 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-banks-toobigtofail-idUSBRE93E06L20130415.
119. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 26, at 627-37.
120. See Hearing, supra note 54, at 48-49 (statement of Kenneth M. Rosen).
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inspectors general from the federal, state, and local levels.'2' Members
include the United States Department of Justice, SEC, CFTC, Federal
Trade Commission, Internal Revenue Service, Treasury, Office of
Thrift Supervision, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, United
States Department of Homeland Security, and the North American
Securities Administrators Association, in addition to the numerous
other organizations.'22 In an environment filled with desire to punish
wrongdoers in the financial crisis, the President's executive order on
the Task Force identified five missions:
[1] to investigate and prosecute financial crimes and other violations
relating to the current financial crisis and economic recovery
efforts;
[2] to recover the proceeds for such crimes and violations;
[3] to address discrimination in the lending and financial markets;
[4] to enhance coordination and cooperation among federal, state and
local authorities responsible for the investigation and prosecution
of financial crimes and violations; and
[5] to conduct outreach to the public, victims, financial institutions,
nonprofit organizations, state and local governments and
agencies, and other interested partners to enhance detection and
prevention of financial fraud schemes. 
1 23
Thus, the Task Force provides a cooperation mechanism in the
enforcement context. Such a model might be used not only for
financial-crisis-related wrongdoings, but also for other regulatory
violation enforcement actions.
A final, fifth principle for the cooperation agenda is to be on the
watch for opportunities to create cooperative networks of cooperative
networks themselves. The international context provides an example
of how this might be fruitful. FSOC's "2015 Annual Report" does not
limit itself to discussing the regulatory activities of FSOC members.
As it contemplates certain reforms, it actually makes specific reference
to the IOSCO "Principles for Financial Benchmarks" and urges the
consideration of those Principles by multiple U.S. regulatory
agencies.124 While there is not a legal convergence requirement that
FSOC use its network of domestic regulators to impose an
international cooperative network's approach to an issue, this indicates
121. See First Year Repor4 TASK FORCE 2.3, 3.3 (2010), http://www.stopfraud.
gov/docs/FFETF-Report-LR.pdf.
122. Id
123. Id at 2.3-.4.
124. SeeFSOC, supranote 83, at 17.
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the greater awareness that cooperative networks have of each other and
an increased willingness to utilize ideas from fellow regulators both in
the United States and abroad.
Hopefully, the cooperation-agenda principle of recognizing
different entities' cooperative efforts, along with the other agenda
principles discussed earlier, will be useful as the need for cooperation
and coordination likely will increase in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the presence of a large number of regulators who touch
on investor and consumer issues both in the United States and abroad
creates a situation in which these regulators may hinder each other's
efforts or create inconsistencies in their approaches to problems.
However, it does not follow that consolidation of agencies into single
regulators necessarily furthers regulatory goals. Instead, especially in
the short term, regulators and those who engage them should search
out opportunities for cooperation and coordination.
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